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Abstract
We analyze different aspects of our quantum modeling approach of human concepts, and
more specifically focus on the quantum effects of contextuality, interference, entanglement
and emergence, illustrating how each of them makes its appearance in specific situations of
the dynamics of human concepts and their combinations. We point out the relation of our
approach, which is based on an ontology of a concept as an entity in a state changing under
influence of a context, with the main traditional concept theories, i.e. prototype theory,
exemplar theory and theory theory. We ponder about the question why quantum theory
performs so well in its modeling of human concepts, and shed light on this question by
analyzing the role of complex amplitudes, showing how they allow to describe interference
in the statistics of measurement outcomes, while in the traditional theories statistics of
outcomes originates in classical probability weights, without the possibility of interference.
The relevance of complex numbers, the appearance of entanglement, and the role of Fock
space in explaining contextual emergence, all as unique features of the quantum modeling,
are explicitly revealed in this paper by analyzing human concepts and their dynamics.
Keywords: concept theory, quantum modeling, entanglement, interference, context, emergence,
human thought
1 Introduction
To understand the structure and dynamics of human concepts, how such concepts combine to
form sentences, and how meaning is expressed by such combinations, is one of the age-old chal-
lenges of scientists studying the human mind. In addition to being a cornerstone for a deeper
understanding of human thinking, it is a crucial condition for progress in many fields, including
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psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. Major scientific issues, such
as text analysis, information retrieval and human-computer interaction, are likewise reliant on a
deeper insight into human concepts. To achieve such insight has proved to be deceptively difficult,
however. It was shown, for example, that concept combinations cannot be modeled properly by
using fuzzy set theory (Osherson & Smith, 1981), and that rules of classical logic are violated
when membership weights of combined concepts are related to membership weights of component
concepts (Hampton, 1988a,b). Much effort has been devoted to these matters, but very few sub-
stantial results have been obtained. Actually, none of the traditional concept theories provides a
satisfactory model for the dynamics of concepts and the way they combine.
More than a decade ago, we started to recognize the presence of typical quantum stuctures and
effects in the dynamics of concepts and their combinations. More specifically, we identified quan-
tum entanglement, showed the presence of contextuality and interference of a genuine quantum
type, and proved the appearance of emergence related to quantum superposition (Aerts, 2009a;
Aerts et al., 2000; Aerts & Gabora, 2005a,b; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011; Gabora & Aerts 2002). Unlike
traditional concept models, the models of human concepts and their dynamics that we developed
by making explicit use of the mathematical formalisms of quantum theory perform well at model-
ing data gathered through different concept experiments, notably in concept combination studies.
What has been put forward to a lesser extent is ‘why’ this quantum approach works. The goal of
this paper is to analyze and attempt to explain what is going on ‘underground’, so to speak, that
makes the approach so effective. In addition to this explanatory focus of the present article, we
will present a review of the most important elements of our quantum modeling approach. We also
refer to the introductory paper Wang et al. (2012) of the special issue where the present article
appears, which provides a general overview, pointing out the potential of quantum modeling for
cognitive processes.
2 Axiomatics, States, Contexts, Gradedness and Fuzziness
It can be seen as a very bold move to start using the quantum formalism to model concepts and
their dynamics, particularly considering the general lack of understanding of quantum physics
itself, expressed colorfully by one of the greatest quantum physicists, Richard Feynman, when he
asserted that, ‘Nobody understands quantum mechanics’ (Feynman, 1967). On the other hand,
due to this very hard struggle of physicists to ‘understand’ the quantum world, many aspects
of quantum theory have been investigated in great depth over the years, laying the foundations
for a strict mathematical and axiomatic framework that also offers a very profound operational
basis (Jauch, 1968; Mackey, 1963; Piron, 1976). For several decades, the activities of our Brussels
research group followed the axiomatic and operational approaches to quantum physics (Aerts,
1982a, 1986, 1999; Aerts & Durt, 1994, Aerts, Coecke & Smets, 1999; Aerts et al., 1997), identi-
fying how specific macroscopic situations – i.e. not necessarily situations of quantum particles in
the micro-world – can be modeled more adequately by a quantum-like formalism than by a clas-
sical formalism (Aerts, 1982b, 1991; Aerts & Van Bogaert, 1992; Aerts et al., 1993, 2000). These
ventures of using quantum structures to model macroscopic situations have played an essential
role in the growing evidence that a quantum description would be appropriate for situations in
human cognition. Indeed, we then applied these insights to model a typical situation of human
decision-making (Aerts & Aerts, 1995).
With respect to applying the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to concepts and
their dynamics, one of the major conceptual steps we took was to consider a concept fundamentally
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as an ‘entity in a specific state’, and not, as in the traditional approaches, as a ‘container of
instantiations’. This container view of a concept remains present in the traditional approaches,
even if fuzzy structures are introduced. After all, a fuzzy set is a set, i.e. a container, even if it
is a fuzzy one. We started to conceive of a concept in this manner in the years 1998-1999, and
first explored the notion of entanglement – admittedly still on a predominantly formal level –,
by proposing a situation of change of state, a collapse, from a more abstract form of a concept
to a more concrete one, violating Bell’s inequalities (Aerts et al., 2000, Gabora 2001). Recent
experiments confirmed such a violation of Bell’s inequalities (Aerts & Sozzo, 2011), and we will
explore this in detail in section 4. The notion of ‘state of a concept’ and the corresponding notion of
‘change of state or collapse’ proved to be very valuable when we investigated connections between
our quantum-inspired approach and traditional concept theories.
In the oldest view on concepts, going back to Aristotle, and now referred to as ‘the classical
view’, all instances of a concept share a common set of necessary and sufficient defining properties.
Wittgenstein (1953) already noted that there is a compelling incongruity between this classical
view and how people actually use concepts. The critical blow to the classical view, however,
was given by Rosch’s work on color (1973). It was shown that colors do not have any particular
criterial attributes or definite boundaries, and instances differ with respect to how typical or
exemplary they are of a category. This led to the formulation of the ‘prototype theory’, according
to which concepts are organized based on family resemblances and consist of characteristic rather
than defining features, which are weighted in the definition of the prototype (Rosch, 1978, 1983).
Rosch showed that subjects rate concept membership as graded, with the degree of membership
of an instance corresponding to the conceptual distance from the prototype. Another strength
of the prototype theory is that it can be mathematically formulated and empirically tested. By
calculating the similarity between the prototype and a possible instance of a concept, across all
salient features, one arrives at a measure of conceptual distance between the instance and the
prototype. It is in this respect that Osherson and Smith (1981) identified a fundamental problem
concerning prototype theory and the combinations of concepts, which has come to be known as
the ‘Pet-Fish Problem’. If the concept of Pet-Fish is the conjunction of the concepts Pet and
Fish, it should follow from fuzzy set theory – where standard connectives for conjunction involve
typicality values that are less than or equal to each of the typicality values of the components
– that the typicality of Guppy is not higher for Pet-Fish than for either Pet or Fish. In reality,
while people rate Guppy neither as a typical Pet nor as a typical Fish, they do rate it as a highly
typical Pet-Fish. This phenomenon of the typicality of a conjunctive concept being greater than
that of either of its constituent concepts has been defined as the ‘Guppy Effect’. It defies the
standard fuzzy set modeling of the behavior of typicality with respect to conjunction. A similar
effect has been proven to exist for membership weights of exemplars. Hampton (1988a,b) showed
that people estimated membership in such a way that the membership weight of an exemplar of
a conjunction of concepts, calculated as the relative frequency of membership estimates, is higher
than the membership weights of this exemplar for one or both of the constituent concepts. This
phenomenon is referred to as ‘overextension’. ‘Double overextension’ is also an experimentally
established phenomenon. In this case, the membership weight of the exemplar for the conjunction
of concepts is higher than the membership weights for ‘both’ constituent concepts (Hampton,
1988a,b, 1997). The problems encountered with composition, the graded nature of exemplars,
the problematic fuzzy nature of typicality and the probabilistic nature of membership weight, are
factors that all have been accounted for in our quantum approach, as we will systematically show
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in the different sections of the present article.
In our quantum approach, a context is modeled mathematically as a measurement, and hence
it changes the state of a concept in the way a measurement in quantum theory changes the state of
a quantum entity (Aerts & Gabora, 2005a; Gabora & Aerts, 2002). For example, in our modeling
of the concept Pet, we considered the context e expressed by Did you see the type of pet he has?
This explains that he is a weird person, and found that when participants in an experiment were
asked to rate different exemplars of Pet, the scores for Snake and Spider were very high in this
context. In our approach, this is explained by introducing different states for the concept Pet. We
call ‘the state of Pet when no specific context is present’, its ground state pˆ. The context e then
changes the ground state pˆ into a new state pweird person pet. Typicality, in our approach, is an
observable semantic quantity, which means that it takes different values in different states. Hence,
in our approach the typicality variations as encountered in the guppy effect are due to changes of
state of the concept Pet under influence of a context. More specifically, the conjunction Pet-Fish
is Pet under the context Fish, in which case the ground state p of Pet is changed into a new state
pFish. The typicality of Guppy, being an observable semantic quantity, will be different depending
on the state, and this explains the high typicality of Guppy in the state pFish of Pet, and its normal
typicality in the ground state p of Pet (Gabora & Aerts 2002).
We developed this approach in a formal way, and called the underlying mathematical stucture
a State Context Property System, abbreviated SCoP (Aerts & Gabora 2005a). To build SCoP,
for an arbitrary concept S, we introduce three sets, namely the set Σ of states, denoting states by
p, q, . . ., the setM of contexts, denoting contexts by e, f, . . ., and the set L of properties, denoting
properties by a, b, . . .. The ‘ground state’ pˆ of the concept S is the state where S is not under the
influence of any particular context. Whenever S is under the influence of a specific context e, a
change of the state of S occurs. In case S was in its ground state pˆ, the ground state changes to a
state p. The difference between states pˆ and p is manifested, for example, by the typicality values
of different exemplars of the concept, and the applicability values of different properties being
different in the two states pˆ and p. Hence, to complete the mathematical construction of SCoP,
also two functions µ and ν are introduced. The function µ : Σ×M×Σ −→ [0, 1] is defined such
that µ(q, e, p) is the probability that state p of concept S under the influence of context e changes
to state q of concept S. The function ν : Σ×L −→ [0, 1] is defined such that ν(p, a) is the weight,
or normalization of applicability, of property a in state p of concept S. With these mathematical
structures and tools the SCoP formalism copes with both ‘contextual typicality’ and ‘contextual
applicability’.
We likewise built an explicit quantum representation in a complex Hilbert space of the data of
the experiment on Pet and Fish and different states of Pet and Fish in different contexts explored
in Aerts & Gabora (2005a), as well as of the concept Pet-Fish (Aerts & Gabora 2005b). In recent
work, we have complemented this representation by considering the quantum effect of interference
which also takes place in the situation of the guppy effect (Aerts et al. 2012).
Our approach can be interpreted in a rather straightforward way as a generalization of proto-
type theory, which explicitly integrates context, unlike standard prototype theory. What we call
the ground state of a concept can thus be seen as the prototype of this concept. However, in our
approach, any context will change this ground state into a new state. Consequently, when the
concept is in this new state, the standard prototype ceases to play the role of prototype. An intu-
itive way of understanding our approach as a generalization of prototype theory, with maximum
use of the wording of prototype theory, would be to consider this new state as a new ‘contextu-
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alized prototype’. Hence, concretely, Pet, when combined with Fish, has a new contextualized
prototype, something which could be called Pet ‘contextualized by Fish’. Of course, the word
‘prototype’ may no longer adequately express this new state, but thinking of the new state as
a ‘contextualized prototype’ aids in grasping the type of generalization our approach constitutes
with respect to prototype theory. Hence, the positioning of our quantum-inspired approach to
prototype theory is rather clear, because we put forward a prototype-like theory that is capable
of fully describing the presence and influence of context.
By specifying the relation of our approach to the two other main traditional concept theories,
‘exemplar theory’ and ‘theory theory’, we can clarify why our approach is more than the contextual
generalization of prototype theory. In exemplar theory, a concept is represented by, not a set of
defining or characteristic features, but a set of salient instances of it stored in memory (Nosofsky,
1988, 1992). In theory theory concepts take the form of ‘mini-theories’ (Murphy & Medin, 1985)
or schemata (Rumelhart & Norman, 1988) identifying the causal relationships amongst properties.
These two approaches reveal their focus on one specific aspect of prototype theory, namely the
situation where a concept is considered to be determined by its set of characteristic rather than
defining features. This means that both theories have mainly been preoccupied with the question,
‘What is it that predominantly determines a concept?’ Although the importance of this question is
self-evident, it has not been the main issue we have focused on in our approach. Transposed to our
approach, this question would read as follows, ‘What is it that predominantly determines the state
of a concept’. The main preoccupation of our approach has been to propose a theory (i) with a
well-defined ontology, i.e. we consider a concept to be an entity capable of different modes of being
with respect to how it influences measurable semantic quantities such as typicality or membership
weight, and we call these modes states; and (ii) that manages to produce theoretical models capable
of fitting experimental data on these measurable semantic quantities. We seek to achieve (i) and
(ii) mainly independently of the question that is the focus of ‘exemplar theory’ and ‘theory theory’,
although we do acknowledge that this is an important aspect. More concretely, and in accordance
with the results of investigations into the question of ‘What predominantly determines a concept’
as far as prototype theory, exemplar theory and theory theory are concerned, we do believe that
all approaches are valid in part. The state of a concept, i.e. its capability of influencing the
values of measurable semantic quantities such as typicality and membership weight, is influenced
by the set of its characteristic features, but also by salient exemplars stored in memory, and in
a considerable number of cases – where more causal aspects are at play – mini-theories might be
appropriate to express this state. For our approach, it is important that ‘the state exists and is
what gives rise to the values of the measurable semantic quantities’, albeit probabilistically, which
in the presence of quantum structure means that potentiality and uncertainty appear even if the
state is completely known.
At this point, we want to underline specifically this important difference between the quan-
tum probability in our quantum approach and general classical probability or fuzziness as used in
the traditional approaches. The modeling of uncertainty and potentiality in quantum probability
theory is profoundly different from that in classical probability theory, i.e. the theory developed
from reflections about chance and games (Laplace, 1820) and formulated later axiomatically (Kol-
mogorov, 1933). Note that it is not the interpretation we refer to but the mathematical structure
of quantum probability itself, which is different from that of classical probability. The guppy effect
might still be regarded as not conclusively pointing towards the presence of quantum structure, in
the sense that many types of connective can be put forward in fuzzy set theory, including one that
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copes with the strange behavior encountered in the guppy effect. The situation is more serious for
the deviations of membership weights identified by Hampton (1988a). Relying on investigations in
quantum probability, it can be proven that this cannot be modeled within a classical probability
theory. More concretely, the membership weights µ(A), µ(B) and µ(A and B) can be represented
within a classical probability model if and only if the following two requirements are satisfied
(Aerts, 2009a, theorem 3)
µ(A and B)−min(µ(A), µ(B)) = ∆c ≤ 0 (1)
0 ≤ kc = 1− µ(A)− µ(B) + µ(A and B) (2)
where we called ∆c the ‘conjunction rule minimum deviation’, and kc, the ‘Kolmogorovian con-
junction factor’. Equations (1) and (2) can be intuitively grasped by noticing that the former
is a consequence of monotonicity of probabilities, while the latter derives from their additivity.
Hampton (1988a) considered, for example, the concepts Food and Plant and their conjunction
Food and Plant. He then conducted tests to measure the extent to which participants decided
whether a certain exemplar was or was not a member of each concept. In the case of the exemplar
Mint, the outcome – the relative frequency of membership – was 0.87 for the concept Food, 0.81
for the concept Plant, and 0.9 for the conjunction Food and Plant. This means that participants
found Mint to be more strongly a member of the conjunction Food and Plant than they found
it to be a member of either of the two component concepts Food and Plant. Also, with A being
Food and B being Plant, inequality (1) is violated, because ∆c = 0.09 6≤ 0. Hence from theorem
3 (Aerts, 2009a) follows that there is no classical probability representation for these data. The
issue of hidden variables in the foundations of quantum physics is related to these investigations
into the nature of quantum probability theory. In this sense, a very general geometric method was
devised to see whether experimental data could be modeled within a classical probability theory.
In Aerts et al. (2009), we confronted all Hampton (1988a) data with this geometrical method,
and found an abundance of data that could not be modeled in a classical probability theory.
The typical differences between quantum probability theory and classical probability theory
immediately suggest that the way Mint violates inequality (1) involves a genuine quantum effect,
not reproducible by even the most complex classically based theoretical framework.
3 The Quantum Realm
We will now investigate parts of what we called ‘the underground’ in the introduction, i.e. the
place where quantum theory is at work, and produces effects fundamentally different from effects
due to classical probability and fuzziness. Compared to quantum theory, classical probabilistic
theories, and also fuzzy set theories, may be said to be merely scratching the surface of things.
Here, ‘things’ refer to a ‘set of situations involving entities, the performance of experiments and the
collection of outcomes’. Classical probability theory – and this is somewhat less clear for fuzzy set
theory, but nonetheless true – has developed a very general approach to the modeling of such a ‘set
of situations involving entities, the performance of experiments and the collection of outcomes’.
Its narrow and limited quality is apparent, however, from the fact that in the end it is a positive
number between zero and one, the probability, that plays the primary role in what is aimed to
be expressed regarding this ‘set of situations involving entities, the performance of experiments
and the collection of outcomes’. A mathematical calculus was developed showing the probability
as the limit of a fraction, viz. the number of desired outcomes of the experiment divided by the
number of experiments done. What could be a more general way to connect mathematics with
reality?
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Quantum theory as a way to describe a ‘set of situations involving entities, the performance of
experiments and the collection of outcomes’ arose in physics, and the phenomenon of ‘interference’
has played an important role in its genesis. Interference is the phenomenon of interacting waves,
and both positive and negative numbers are key to their interference pattern. A wave is best
modeled by regarding its crests as positive lengths away from the average and its troughs as
negative lengths away from the average. When two waves interact, the crests of the one, when
colliding with the troughs of the other, will partly be annihilated, giving rise to a specific pattern.
This is comparable to how part of the value of a positive number is annihilated when the number
is summed with a negative number. The pattern following from this partial annihilation between
crests and troughs is the interference pattern.
Interference is a good example of a phenomenon that cannot be described by only focusing on
positive numbers. It may of course be possible that ‘probabilities’ and ‘fuzziness’ in essence do not
interfere. We would be tempted to believe this if we considered, for example, the relative frequency
definition of probability. It is an experimental fact that in the micro-world probabilities interfere.
This is mathematically taken into account in quantum theory through the use of complex numbers
rather than positive real numbers to express the probabilities. More specifically, it is the square
of the absolute value of this complex number that gives rise to the probability. There is also
interference when probabilities are considered in relation to human decisions. We believe that, in
depth, this is due to both realms – the one of quantum particles in the micro-world and the one
of conceptual structures in semantic space – being realms of genuine ‘potentialities’, not of the
type of a ‘lack of knowledge of actualities’. This insight also led us to present a quantum model
for a human-decision process (Aerts & Aerts, 1995), since as a rule human decisions are made in
a state of genuine potentiality, which is not of the type of a lack of knowledge of an actuality.
The following example serves to illustrate this. In Aerts & Aerts (1995), we considered a survey
including the question ‘are you a smoker or not’. Suppose that of the total of 100 participants 21
said ‘yes’ to this question. We can then attribute 0.21 as the probability of finding a smoker in this
sample of participants. However, this probability is obviously of the type of a ‘lack of knowledge
about an actuality’, because each participant ‘is’ a smoker or ‘is not’ a smoker. Suppose that
we now consider the question ‘are you for or against the use of nuclear energy?’ and that 31
participants say they are in favor. In this case, the resulting probability, i.e. 0.31, is ‘not’ of the
type of ‘lack of knowledge about an actuality’. Indeed, since some of the participants had no
opinion about this question before the survey, the outcome was influenced by the ‘context’ at the
time the question was asked, including the specific conceptual structure of how the question was
formulated. This is how ‘context’ plays an essential role whenever the human mind is concerned
with the outcomes of experiments. It can be shown that the first type of probability, i.e. the
type that models a ‘lack of knowledge about an actuality’, is classical, and that the second type
is non-classical (Aerts, 1986).
Let us now illustrate how we model interference for Hampton’s (1988a) membership test by
using the quantum formalism. We consider two concepts A and B, and their conjunction A and B,
and an exemplar. Hampton (1988a) measured membership weights, i.e. probabilities µ(A), µ(B)
and µ(A and B), for this exemplar to be a member of A, B and A and B. The equation that
describes a general quantum modeling – we refer to Aerts (2009a), section 1.7, for its derivation,
and mention that conjunction has been treated differently in Franco (2009) – is the following
µ(A and B) = m2µ(A)µ(B) + n2(
µ(A) + µ(B)
2
+ <〈A|M |B〉) (3)
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where the numbers 0 ≤ m2 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ n2 ≤ 1 are convex coefficients, hence we have m2 +n2 = 1,
and <〈A|M |B〉 is the interference term.
In this interference term, the mathematical objects appear that are fundamental to the quan-
tum formalism, namely unit vectors of a complex Hilbert space (〈A| and |B〉 are such unit vectors),
and orthogonal projection operators on this complex Hilbert space (M is such an orthogonal pro-
jection operator). The expression 〈A|M |B〉 is the inner product in this complex Hilbert space,
and this is a complex number. <〈A|M |B〉 is the ‘real part’ of this complex number. For readers
not acquainted with the quantum formalism, we have added in appendix A an explanation of the
mathematics needed for our use of quantum theory.
Let us first remark that µ(A)µ(B) is what would be expected for the conjunction in the case
of a classical probability. Hence, when m = 1 and n = 0, we are in this ‘classical probability’
situation. Since µ(A)µ(B) ≤ µ(A) and µ(A)µ(B) ≤ µ(B), we have µ(A)µ(B) ≤ µ(A)+µ(B)
2
.
Suppose that we do not have interference, and hence <〈A|M |B〉 = 0, then (3) expresses that
µ(A and B) ∈ [µ(A)µ(B), µ(A)+µ(B)
2
]. Hence for values of µ(A and B) outside this interval a
genuine interference contribution is needed for (3) to have a solution. We introduce
0 ≤ fc = min(µ(A) + µ(B)
2
− µ(A and B), µ(A and B)− µ(A)µ(B)) (4)
as the criterion for a possible solution without the need for genuine interference. Let us consider
again the example of Mint, with respect to Food, Plant and Food and Plant and its data taken
from Hampton (1988a). We have fc = −0.06, and hence for Mint the quantum interference term
needs to attribute for a solution of equation (3) to be possible. We showed in Aerts (2009a),
section 1.5, that a solution can be found in a three-dimensional complex Hilbert space, such that
<〈A|M |B〉 =
√
(1− µ(A))(1− µ(B)) cos β (5)
where β is the interference angle, and the unit vectors |A〉 and |B〉 representing the states of the
concepts A and B in the canonical basis of this three-dimensional complex Hilbert space are as
follows
|A〉 = (
√
µ(A), 0,
√
1− µ(A)) (6)
|B〉 = eiβ(
√
(1− µ(A))(1− µ(B))
µ(A)
,
√
µ(A) + µ(B)− 1
µ(A)
,−
√
1− µ(B)) (7)
β = arccos(
2
n2
(µ(A and B)−m2µ(A)µ(B))− µ(A)− µ(B)
2
√
(1− µ(A))(1− µ(B)) ) (8)
To construct a solution for Mint, we take m2 = 0.3 and n2 = 0.7, and find the value for β, using
(8), β = 50.21◦. We can see in the vector |B〉 representing concept B that a complex number
plays an essential role, namely eiβ, which is present in all components of the vector. This is the
root of the interference, and hence the deep reason that the membership weight of Mint for Food
and Plant can be bigger than the membership of Mint for Food and the membership of Mint for
Plant.
To show this explicitly in the above Hilbert space model would be technically sophisticated –
see Aerts (2009a) for an explicit discussion. For this reason, we will use just two complex numbers
to illustrate directly ‘how they allow interference to take place’. Consider two complex numbers
aeiα and beiβ, both of absolute values, a and b, respectively, smaller than or equal to 1, such
that the squares of absolute values, hence a2 and b2, can represent probabilities. Suppose they
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represent probabilities µ(A) and µ(B) of disjoint events A and B, such that A∩B = ∅. In classical
probability, the probability of the joint event µ(A∪B) is in this case equal to the sum µ(A)+µ(B).
In quantum theory, the complex numbers need to be summed and subsequently the probability
is calculated from this sum of complex numbers by squaring its absolute value. Hence, we get
µ(A∪B) = (aeiα+beiβ)∗(aeiα+beiβ) = (ae−iα+be−iβ)(aeiα+beiβ) = a2+b2+abei(β−α)+abe−i(β−α) =
a2 + b2 + 2ab cos(β−α), where we have used Euler’s equation cosφ+ i sinφ = eiφ, for an arbitrary
angle φ. This shows that
µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B) + 2
√
µ(A)µ(B) cos(β − α) (9)
Consider the similarity between equations (9) and (3), certainly following substitution (5) in (3).
By this we intend to show that interferences, and hence the deviations Hampton (1988a) measured
using membership weights, are directly due to the use of complex numbers.
Having put forward the hypothesis that interference on the level of probabilities is connected
with the presence of potentiality, we cannot resist the temptation to finish the section by pointing
out that the invention of complex numbers was guided by potentiality as well. Back in 1545, when
even negative numbers were not completely allowed as genuine numbers, the Italian mathemati-
cian Gerolamo Cardano introduced ‘imaginary numbers’ in an attempt to find solutions to cubic
equations (Cardano, 1545). What is amusing is that Cardano used these numbers in intermediate
steps, which is why they only played the role of ‘potential numbers’. He eliminated them once
he had found real number solutions. While he called them ‘sophistic’ and ‘a mental torture’, he
was also fascinated by them. Independently of their practical use in his work on cubic equations,
he put forward, for example, the problem of finding two numbers that have a sum of 10 and a
product of 40. A solution is of course the complex numbers 5 ± i√15. Cardano wrote down the
solution, and commented that ‘this result is as subtle as it is useless’. Cardano would certainly
be amazed and delighted to know that quantum interference happens exactly the way in which
10 can be the sum of two numbers whose product is 40. We can see this even explicitly if we use
the goniometric representation. Then the two numbers are
√
40eiα and
√
40e−iα and their sum
2
√
40 cosα. For an interference angle α = 37.76◦, we find the sum equal to 10.
Is quantum theory the final theory for what we called ‘the underground’? That is not certain.
The aspects that can be additionally modeled by quantum theory, and cannot be modeled by
classical probability or fuzziness, such as ‘interference’, ‘entanglement’, and ‘emergence’, continue
to be the subject of constant investigation with a view to gaining a better understanding. Hence, it
is very well possible that new and even more powerful ‘underground theories’ will arise, substituting
quantum theory, and generalizing it. Quantum axiomatics is a domain of research actively engaged
in investigating operational foundations and generalizations of quantum theory.
In the next section, we turn to one of the very intriguing aspects of quantum theory, namely
entanglement. We will show experimentally that the way entanglement takes place spontaneously
when two concepts combine is very similar to how it takes place in the quantum world.
4 Entanglement
Entanglement is tested by Bell’s inequalities, which were historically introduced in physics with
respect to the problem of completeness of quantum mechanics. Indeed, quantum theory provides
predictions that are correct and confirmed by experiments, but these predictions are generally only
probabilistic, i.e. they refer to the statistics of outcomes of repeated measurements. Hence the
question arose whether it would be possible to introduce ‘hidden variables’ which, once specified
together with the state of the entity, would allow one to predict the outcomes of any measurement
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performed on the entity itself. In this perspective, quantum probabilities would just formalize
the lack of knowledge about these underlying ‘hidden variables’. There is in physics a well-
known class of inequalities, whose prototype is the Bell inequality (Bell, 1964), which hold under
reasonable physical assumptions (‘local realism’) and yet are violated by quantum mechanics in
specific physical situations in which different inequalities (‘quantum inequalities’) hold. We briefly
summarize the reasoning that led to the deduction of one of these inequalities in the framework
of a hidden variable research program (Clauser et al., 1969).
The term ‘local realism’ has been traditionally used to denote the join of the assumptions of
‘realism’, i.e. the values of all observables of a physical system in a given state are predetermined
for any measurement context, and ‘locality’, i.e. if measurements are made at places remote from
one another on parts of a physical system which no longer interact, the specific features of one of
the measurements do not influence the results obtained with the others.
The standard procedures leading to the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt variant of Bell’s inequal-
ity can then be resumed as follows. Let U be a composite entity made up of the far-away subentities
S and T , and let A(a) and B(b) be two dichotomic observables of S and T , depending on the
experimentally adjustable parameters a and b, respectively, and taking either value −1 or +1.
By assuming ‘realism’, the expectation value of the product of the dichotomic observables A(a)
and B(b) in a state p is
E(A,B) =
∫
Λ
A(λ, a)B(λ, b)ρ(λ)dλ (10)
where λ is a ‘deterministic hidden variable’ whose value ranges over the measurable space Λ
when different examples of the entity U are considered, while ρ is a probability density on Λ
(determined by p, A(a) and B(b)). Finally, A(λ, a), B(λ, b) = ±1 are the values of the dichotomic
observables A(a) and B(b). If one also introduces the dichotomic observables A(a′) and B(b′) of S
and T , respectively, one gets similar formulas for the expectation values E(A,B′), E(A′, B) and
E(A′, B′). Therefore, one obtains, by assuming ‘locality’, the following Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt inequality (Clauser et al., 1969)
− 2 ≤ E(A′, B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A,B′)− E(A,B) ≤ 2 (11)
It is then well known that there are examples in which the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality
is violated by the expectation values predicted by quantum mechanics for suitable choices of the
parameters a, b, a′, b′. According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics this implies
that ‘realism’ and ‘locality’ cannot both hold in quantum mechanics. As long as the inequality
was not tested experimentally, views of the issue differed. Some physicists, for example, surmised
that a failure of the theoretical framework of quantum theory might be detected for the first
time. However, experimental tests confirmed the predictions of quantum mechanics to violate
Bell’s inequality (Aspect et al., 1982). This definitely changed the attitude of many physicists, in
that they now started to take more seriously also the deeply strange aspects of ‘quantum reality’.
The situation of quantum theory that gives rise to the violation of Bell’s inequality is called
‘entanglement’ (see appendix A). It corresponds to a specific state, called an ‘entangled state’, in
which two entities can be prepared. The presence of such entangled states for two entities indicates
that it is no longer possible to consider the two entities as existing independently, because they
have essentially merged into one entity that behaves as an undivided whole.
We will show in this section that two simple concepts that are combined give rise to the
violation of Bell’s inequalities, which proves that concepts combine in such a way that they are
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entangled. In this section we put forward the results of the experiment we performed, showing
how it violates Bell’s inequalities, and we will analyze its meaning in section 6.
We consider the concept Animal and the concept Acts, and join them to form the conceptual
combination The Animal Acts. To bring about a situation that is necessary to formulate Bell’s
inequalities, we have to consider experiments on Animal combined with experiments on Acts,
hence joint experiments on The Animal Acts, and measure the expectation values of possible
outcomes. Bell’s inequalities are indeed formulated by means of the expectation values of such
joint experiments.
Let us introduce the experiments A and A′ on Animal, and B and B′ on Acts. Experiment A
consists in participants being asked to choose between two exemplars, Horse and Bear, as possible
answers to the statement ‘is a good example of Animal’. Experiment A′ consists in asking the
participants to choose between the two exemplars Tiger and Cat, as possible answers to the
statement ‘is a good example of Animal’. Experiment B asks the participants to choose between
the exemplars Growls and Whinnies, as possible answers to the statement ‘is a good example of
Acts’. Experiment B′ considers the choice between the exemplars Snorts and Meows regarding
the statement ‘is a good example of Acts’.
Next we consider the coincidence experiments AB, A′B, AB′ and A′B′ for the combination
The Animal Acts. More concretely, in the experiment AB, to answer the question ‘is a good
example of The Animal Acts’, participants will choose between the four possibilities (1) The
Horse Growls, (2) The Bear Whinnies – and if one of these is chosen we put E(AB) = +1 – and
(3) The Horse Whinnies, (4) The Bear Growls – and if one of these is chosen we put E(AB) = −1.
In the coincidence experiment, A′B participants, to answer the question ‘is a good example of
The Animal Acts’, will choose between (1) The Tiger Growls, (2) The Cat Whinnies – and in
case one of these is chosen we put E(A′B) = +1 – and (3) The Tiger Whinnies, (4) The Cat
Growls – and in case one of these is chosen we put E(A′B) = −1. In the coincidence experiment,
AB′ participants, to answer the question ‘is a good example of The Animal Acts’, will choose
between (1) The Horse Snorts, (2) The Bear Meows – and in case one of these is chosen, we put
E(AB′) = +1 – and (3) The Horse Meows, (4) The Bear Snorts – and in case one of these is
chosen we put E(AB′) = −1. Finally, in the coincidence experiment, A′B′ participants, to answer
the question ‘is a good example of The Animal Acts’, will choose between (1) The Tiger Snorts,
(2) The Cat Meows – and in case one of these is chosen we put E(A′B′) = +1 – and (3) The Tiger
Meows, (4) The Cat Snorts – and in case one of these is chosen we put E(A′B′) = −1.
We can now evaluate the expectation values E(A′, B′), E(A′, B), E(A,B′) and E(A,B) as-
sociated with the coincidence experiments A′B′, A′B, AB′ and AB, respectively, and substitute
them into the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt variant of Bell’s inequality (Clauser et al., 1969)
− 2 ≤ E(A′, B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A,B′)− E(A,B) ≤ 2. (12)
We performed an experiment involving 81 participants who were presented a questionnaire to
be filled out in which they were asked to make a choice among the above alternatives in the
experiments AB, A′B, AB′ and A′B′ for the combination The Animal Acts. Table 1 contains the
results of our experiment.
If we denote by P (A1, B1), P (A2, B2), P (A1, B2), P (A2, B1), the probability that The Horse
Growls, The Bear Whinnies, The Horse Whinnies, The Bear Growls, respectively, is chosen in the
coincidence experiment AB, and so on, the expectation values are
E(A,B) = P (A1, B1) + P (A2, B2)− P (A2, B1)− P (A1, B2) = −0.7778
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E(A′, B) = P (A′1, B1) + P (A
′
2, B2)− P (A′2, B1)− P (A′1, B2) = 0.6543
E(A,B′) = P (A1, B′1) + P (A2, B
′
2)− P (A2, B′1)− P (A1, B′2) = 0.3580
E(A′, B′) = P (A′1, B
′
1) + P (A
′
2, B
′
2)− P (A′2, B′1)− P (A′1, B′2) = 0.6296
Hence, the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt variant of Bell’s inequalities gives
E(A′, B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A,B′)− E(A,B) = 2.4197 (13)
which is greater than 2. This means that it violates Bell’s inequalities, indeed, it does so close to
the maximal possible violation in quantum theory, viz. 2 · √2 ≈ 2.8284.
AB Horse Growls Horse Whinnies Bear Growls Bear Whinnies
P (A1, B1) = 0.049 P (A1, B2) = 0.630 P (A2, B1) = 0.259 P (A2, B2) = 0.062
A′B Tiger Growls Tiger Whinnies Cat Growls Cat Whinnies
P (A′1, B1) = 0.778 P (A
′
1, B2) = 0.086 P (A
′
2, B1) = 0.086 P (A
′
2, B2) = 0.049
AB′ Horse Snorts Horse Meows Bear Snorts Bear Meows
P (A1, B
′
1) = 0.593 P (A1, B
′
2) = 0.025 P (A2, B
′
1) = 0.296 P (A2, B
′
2) = 0.086
A′B′ Tiger Snorts Tiger Meows Cat Snorts Cat Meows
P (A′1, B
′
1) = 0.148 P (A
′
1, B
′
2) = 0.086 P (A
′
2, B
′
1) = 0.099 P (A
′
2, B
′
2) = 0.667
Table 1: The data collected with our experiment on entanglement in concepts.
The violation we detected is very significant in proving the presence of entanglement between
the concept Animal and the concept Acts in the combination The Animal Acts, because it can
be shown that effects of disturbance of the experiment push the value of the Bell expression in
equation (12) towards a value between -2 and +2. In Aerts & Sozzo (2011) we performed a
statistical analysis of the empirical data using the ‘t-test for paired two samples for means’ to
estimate the probability that the shifts from Bell’s inequalities is due to chance. We compared the
data collected in the real experiment with the data collected in the ‘classical’ experiment, where
no influence of context and meaning is present. It was possible to conclude convincingly that the
deviation effects were not caused by random fluctuations. For a further discussion of different
aspect related to this results, we refer to Aerts & Sozzo (2011).
We note that the fundamental role played by entanglement in concept combination and word
association was pointed out by Nelson and McEvoy (2007) and Bruza et al. (2008, 2009, 2011). It
was shown that if one assumes that words can become entangled in the human mental lexicon, then
one can provide a unified theoretical framework in which two seemingly competing approaches for
modeling the activation level of words in human memory, namely, the ‘Spreading Activation’ and
the ‘Spooky-activation-at-a-distance’, can be recovered.
5 Interference
We already brought up interference at length in section 3, with respect to the guppy effect and
more concretely the membership experiments of Hampton (1988a). In this section, we illustrate
the phenomenon of interference for concept combinations in a way that is closer to its essence than
in the case of membership weights, where it appeared historically for the first time as a consequence
of the Hampton (1988a) measurements. In section 2, we mentioned how we introduced the notion
of state, and the notion of change of state under the influence of a context, and how exemplars of
a concept in our SCoP approach are states of this concept. Change of state is often called collapse
in quantum theory, more specifically when it is a change of state provoked by an experiment or
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a decision process. The state before the experiment or decision is said to collapse to one of the
possible states after the experiment or decision. If we consider our example of the The Animal
Acts, and we denote the state before the experiment or decision by pAnimal Acts, then this state
changes to one of the exemplar states pHorse Growls, pHorse Whinnies, pBear Growls or pBear Whinnies.
Hence, this collapse is a change from a more abstract state to more concrete states, expressed by
exemplars of the original concept. Also, with regard to interference taking place with combining
concepts, we want to look at it for quantum collapses taking place from abstract concept states
to more concrete exemplar states.
Let us consider the two concepts Fruits and Vegetables, and their disjunction Fruits or Veg-
etables. We consider a collection of exemplars, more specifically those listed in Table 2, which are
the ones Hampton (1988b) experimented on for the disjunction of Fruits and Vegetables. Then
we consider the experiment consisting in participants being asked to choose one of the exemplars
from the list of Table 2 that they find ‘a good example of’ A = Fruits, B = Vegetables, and A
or B = Fruits or Vegetables, respectively. The quantities µ(A)k, µ(B)k and µ(A or B)k are the
relative frequencies of the outcomes for this experiment, which are also given in Table 2. Let us
remark that Hampton (1988b) did not perform this experiment, since he was testing the mem-
bership weights for the concepts and their disjunction. However, in his experiment, Hampton
(1988b) tested for the ‘degree of membership’ by asking the participants, 40 undergraduate psy-
chology students, to rate the membership on a Likert scale {−3,−2,−1, 0,+1,+2,+3}, where
positive numbers stand for ‘membership’, and negative numbers for ‘non-membership’, the size
of the number corresponding to ‘the degree of membership or non-membership’. In view of the
very strong correlation between ‘degree of membership’ and ‘a good example of’, we used the
data of Hampton (1988b) to calculate the relative frequencies. In future research, we intend to
conduct an experiment directly measuring ‘good example of’, in a similar manner as in our study
of entanglement and The Animal Acts.
We constructed an explicit quantum mechanical model in complex Hilbert space for the pair of
concepts Fruit and Vegetable and their disjunction Fruit or Vegetable, with respect to the relative
frequencies calculated from Hampton (1988b) experimental data (Aerts, 2009b, section 3). We
represent here its main aspects following the quantum modeling scheme explained in detail in
appendix A. The measurement ‘a good example of’ is represented by a spectral family {Mk | k =
1, . . . , 24}, where each Mk is an orthogonal projection of the Hilbert space C25 corresponding to
item k from the list of items in Table 2.
The concepts Fruits, Vegetables and Fruits or Vegetables are represented by unit vectors |A〉,
|B〉 and 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉) of this Hilbert space, where |A〉 and |B〉 are orthogonal, and 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉)
is their normalized superposition. Following standard quantum rules, we have µ(A)k = 〈A|Mk|A〉,
µ(B)k = 〈B|Mk|B〉, and
µ(A orB)k=(
1√
2
(〈A|+〈B|)Mk( 1√2(|A〉+|B〉))= 12(〈A|Mk|A〉+〈B|Mk|B〉+〈A|Mk|B〉+〈B|Mk|A〉)
= 1
2
(µ(A)k + µ(B)k) + <〈A|Mk|B〉 (14)
where <〈A|Mk|B〉, the real part of the complex number 〈A|Mk|B〉, is the interference term.
Remark the similarity with equation 3 of section 3. We showed in Aerts (2009b) that we can
find a solution for
<〈A|Mk|B〉 = ck
√
µ(A)kµ(B)k cosφk cosφk =
2µ(A or B)k − µ(A)k − µ(B)k
2ck
√
µ(A)kµ(B)k
(15)
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(see Table 2), where ck is chosen in such a way that 〈A|B〉 = 0.
µ(A)k µ(B)k µ(A or B)k
1
2(µ(A)k + µ(B)k) φk
A=Fruits, B=Vegetables
1 Almond 0.0359 0.0133 0.0269 0.0246 83.8854◦
2 Acorn 0.0425 0.0108 0.0249 0.0266 -94.5520◦
3 Peanut 0.0372 0.0220 0.0269 0.0296 -95.3620◦
4 Olive 0.0586 0.0269 0.0415 0.0428 91.8715◦
5 Coconut 0.0755 0.0125 0.0604 0.0440 57.9533◦
6 Raisin 0.1026 0.0170 0.0555 0.0598 95.8648◦
7 Elderberry 0.1138 0.0170 0.0480 0.0654 -113.2431◦
8 Apple 0.1184 0.0155 0.0688 0.0670 87.6039◦
9 Mustard 0.0149 0.0250 0.0146 0.0199 -105.9806◦
10 Wheat 0.0136 0.0255 0.0165 0.0195 99.3810◦
11 Root Ginger 0.0157 0.0323 0.0385 0.0240 50.0889◦
12 Chili Pepper 0.0167 0.0446 0.0323 0.0306 -86.4374◦
13 Garlic 0.0100 0.0301 0.0293 0.0200 -57.6399◦
14 Mushroom 0.0140 0.0545 0.0604 0.0342 18.6744◦
15 Watercress 0.0112 0.0658 0.0482 0.0385 -69.0705◦
16 Lentils 0.0095 0.0713 0.0338 0.0404 104.7126◦
17 Green Pepper 0.0324 0.0788 0.0506 0.0556 -95.6518◦
18 Yam 0.0533 0.0724 0.0541 0.0628 98.0833◦
19 Tomato 0.0881 0.0679 0.0688 0.0780 100.7557◦
20 Pumpkin 0.0797 0.0713 0.0579 0.0755 -103.4804◦
21 Broccoli 0.0143 0.1284 0.0642 0.0713 -99.6048◦
22 Rice 0.0140 0.0412 0.0248 0.0276 -96.6635◦
23 Parsley 0.0155 0.0266 0.0308 0.0210 -61.1698◦
24 Black Pepper 0.0127 0.0294 0.0222 0.0211 86.6308◦
Table 2: Interference data for concepts A=Fruits and B=Vegetables. The probability of being chosen as ‘a
good example of’ Fruits (Vegetables) is µ(A) (µ(B)) for each of the exemplars. The probability of being chosen
as ‘a good example of’ Fruits or Vegetables is µ(A or B) for each of the exemplars. The classical probability
is µ(A)+µ(B)2 and θ is the quantum interference angle.
We construct an explicit solution with the following vectors
|A〉 = (0.1895, 0.2061, 0.1929, 0.2421, 0.2748, 0.3204, 0.3373, 0.3441, 0.1222, 0.1165, 0.1252, 0.1291,
0.1002, 0.1182, 0.1059, 0.0974, 0.1800, 0.2308, 0.2967, 0.2823, 0.1194, 0.1181, 0.1245, 0.1128, 0)
|B〉 = (0.1154ei83.8854◦ , 0.1040e−i94.5520◦ , 0.1484e−i95.3620◦ , 0.1640ei91.8715◦ , 0.1120ei57.9533◦ ,
0.1302ei95.8648
◦
, 0.1302e−i113.2431
◦
, 0.1246ei87.6039
◦
, 0.1580e−i105.9806
◦
, 0.1596ei99.3810
◦
,
0.1798ei50.0889
◦
, 0.2112e−i86.4374
◦
, 0.1734e−i57.6399
◦
, 0.2334ei18.6744
◦
, 0.2565e−i69.0705
◦
,
0.2670ei104.7126
◦
, 0.2806e−i95.6518
◦
, 0.2690ei98.0833
◦
, 0.2606ei100.7557
◦
, 0.2670e−i103.4804
◦
,
0.3584e−i99.6048
◦
, 0.2031e−i96.6635
◦
, 0.1630e−i61.1698
◦
, 0.1716ei86.6308
◦
, 0.1565) (16)
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We worked out a way to represent graphically the quantum interference of Fruits with Vegetables
(Aerts, 2009b). For the concepts Fruits, Vegetables and Fruits or Vegetables we use complex
valued wave functions of two real variables ψA(x, y), ψB(x, y) and ψAorB(x, y) to represent them.
We choose ψA(x, y) and ψB(x, y) such that the real part for both wave functions is a Gaussian in
two dimensions, such that the top of the first Gaussian is in the origin, and the top of the second
Gaussian is located in the point (a, b). Hence
ψA(x, y) =
√
DAe
−( x2
4σ2
Ax
+ y
2
4σ2
Ay
)
eiSA(x,y) ψB(x, y) =
√
DBe
−( (x−a)2
4σ2
Bx
+
(y−b)2
4σ2
By
)
eiSB(x,y) (17)
The squares of these Gaussians – also Gaussians – represent the membership weights and are
graphically represented in Figures 1 and 2, and the different exemplars of Table 2 are located in
spots such that the Gaussian distributions |ψA(x, y)|2 and |ψB(x, y)|2 properly model the proba-
bilities µ(A)k and µ(B)k in Table 2 for each one of the exemplars.
Figure 1: The probabilities µ(A)k of a person choosing the exemplar k as a ‘good example of’ Fruits are
fitted into a two-dimensional quantum wave function ψA(x, y). The numbers are placed at the locations of
the different exemplars with respect to the Gaussian probability distribution |ψA(x, y)|2. This can be seen
as a light source shining through a hole centered on the origin, and regions where the different exemplars
are located. The brightness of the light source in a specific region corresponds to the probability that this
exemplar will be chosen as a ‘good example of’ Fruits.
This is always possible, taking into account the parameters of the Gaussians, DA, DB, σAx, σAy,
σBx, σBy, a, b and the necessity to fit 24 values, namely the values of µ(A)k and µ(B)k for each
of the exemplars of Table 2. Remark that the constraint comes from the exemplars having to
be located in exactly the same points of the plane for both Gaussians. Although the solution is
an elaborate mathematical calculation, it is also straightforward, so that we leave its elaboration
to the interested and exploring reader. It is not unique, but different solutions are topologically
stretched versions of the one we the one we use in this article, which means that the interference
pattern of other solutions is topomorphic to the one we present here.
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Figure 2: The probabilities µ(B)k of a person choosing the exemplar k as a ‘good example of’ Vegetables
are fitted into a two-dimensional quantum wave function ψB(x, y). The numbers are placed at the locations
of the different exemplars with respect to the probability distribution |ψB(x, y)|2. This can be seen as a light
source shining through a hole centered on point 21, where Broccoli is located. The brightness of the light
source in a specific region corresponds to the probability that this exemplar will be chosen as a ‘good example
of’ Vegetables.
Figure 3: The probabilities µ(A or B)k of a person choosing the exemplar k as a ‘good example of’ ‘Fruits
or Vegetables’ are fitted into the two-dimensional quantum wave function 1√
2
(ψA(x, y) + ψB(x, y)), which
is the normalized superposition of the wave functions in Figures 1 and 2. The numbers are placed at the
locations of the different exemplars with respect to the probability distribution 12 |ψA(x, y) + ψB(x, y)|2 =
1
2 (|ψA(x, y)|2 + |ψB(x, y)|2) + |ψA(x, y)ψB(x, y)| cosφ(x, y), where φ(x, y) is the quantum phase difference at
(x, y). The values of φ(x, y) are given in Table 1 for the locations of the different exemplars. The interference
pattern is clearly visible.
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For Fruits represented in Figure 1, Apple is located in the center of the Gaussian, since Apple
appears most as a ‘good example of’ Fruits. Elderberry is second, and hence closest to the top
of the Gaussian in Figure 1. Then come Raisin, Tomato and Pumpkin, and so on, with Garlic
and Lentils the least chosen ‘good examples’ of Fruits. For Vegetables, represented in Figure 2,
Broccoli is located in the center of the Gaussian, since Broccoli appears most as a ‘good example
of’ Vegetables. Green Pepper is second, and hence closest to the top of the Gaussian in Figure 2.
Then come Yam, Lentils and Pumpkin, and so on, with Coconut and Acorn as the least chosen
‘good examples’ of Vegetables. Metaphorically, we can regard the graphical representations of
Figures 1 and 2 as the projections of a light source shining through one of two holes in a plate
and spreading out its light intensity following a Gaussian distribution when projected on a screen
behind the holes.
The center of the first Fruits hole is located where exemplar Apple is at point (0, 0), indicated
by 8 in both figures. The center of the second Vegetables hole is located where exemplar Broccoli
is at point (10,4), indicated by 21 in both figures.
In Figure 3, the data for Fruits or Vegetables are graphically represented. This is the prob-
ability distribution corresponding to 1√
2
(ψA(x, y) + ψB(x, y)), which is the normalized superpo-
sition of the wave functions in Figures 1 and 2, which is not ‘just’ a normalized sum of the
two Gaussians of Figures 1 and 2. The numbers are placed at the locations of the different
exemplars with respect to the probability distribution 1
2
|ψA(x, y) + ψB(x, y)|2 = 12(|ψA(x, y)|2 +|ψB(x, y)|2) + |ψA(x, y)ψB(x, y)| cosφ(x, y), where |ψA(x, y)ψB(x, y)| cosφ(x, y) is the interference
term and φ(x, y) = SA(x, y) − SB(x, y) the quantum phase difference at (x, y). We calculated a
solution for the function φ(x, y) as a linear combination of powers of products of x and y, electing
the lowest powers to attain 25 linear independent functions, with the constraint that the values
of φ(x, y) coincide with the ones in Table 2 for the locations of the different exemplars. It can be
proven that such a solution exists and is unique.
The interference pattern shown in Figure 3 is very similar to well-known interference patterns
of light passing through an elastic material under stress. In our case, it is the interference pattern
corresponding to Fruits or Vegetables. Bearing in mind the analogy with the light source for
Figures 1 and 2, in Figure 3 we can see the interference pattern produced when both holes are
open. Figure 4 represents a three-dimensional graphic of the interference pattern of Figure 3,
and, for the sake of comparison, in Figure 5, we have graphically represented the averages of the
probabilities of Figures 1 and 2, i.e. the values measured if there were no interference. For a more
detailed analysis we refer to Aerts (2009b), and we put forward the graphical representation of an
example of conceptual interference for the conjunction of two concepts in Aerts et al (2012).
The expression of vector |B〉 in equation (16) confirms the underground nature of quantum
theory in a convincing way. We see that each of the 25 components is intrinsically complex with
different interference angles. Indeed, it can be proven that a representation in a real vectors space
cannot reproduce the interference pattern for Fruits or Vegetables, as graphically shown in Figures
3 and 4.
A very interesting similarity can be noted between the type of modeling we explore in this
section, and semantic space approaches in computer science, where terms and documents are
represented in a term-document matrix, which makes it possible to introduce a real vector space
model (Aerts & Czachor, 2004). Latent Semantic Analysis is a well-known and powerful example
of these approaches (Deerwester et al., 1990).
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Figure 4: A three-dimensional representation of the interference landscape of the concept ‘Fruits or Vegetables’
as shown in Figure 3. Exemplars are represented by little green balls, and the numbers refer to the numbering
of the exemplars in Table 1 and in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Figure 5: Probabilities 1/2(µ(A)k + µ(B)k), which are the probability averages for Fruits and Vegetables
shown in Figures 1 and 2. This would be the resulting pattern in case φ(x, y) = 90◦ for all exemplars. It is
called the classical pattern for the situation since it is the pattern that, without interference, results from a
situation where classical particles are sent through two slits. These classical values for all exemplars are given
in Table 1.
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But connections with quantum structures have been indicated also for information retrieval, an
exploding and important domain in computer science building on semantic space approaches
(Van Rijsbergen, 2004; Widdows & Peters, 2003) and they are now explored intensively (Li &
Cunningham, 2008; Melucci, 2008; Piwowarski et al., 2010; Widdows, 2006; Zuccon & Azzopardi,
2010). Our guess is that the structure of the real – and not complex – vector space that governs
the traditional semantic spaces, and the derived information retrieval schemes, will turn out to
correspond to a provisional stage on the way toward a ‘complex number semantic space scheme’.
Hence it will be a fascinating challenge further to increase our understanding of the role of complex
numbers, also with respect to how ‘terms’ – in our view ‘concepts’ – relate to ‘documents’ – in our
view ‘conceptual contexts’. We hope that the type of intrinsically complex model we put forward
in this section can help shed light on this aspect.
6 Emergence and Potentiality
The guppy effect and the effects of overextension and underextension identified in concept research
by Osherson (1981) and Hampton (1988a,b), respectively, have their counterparts in other domains
of psychology. There is a whole set of findings, often referred to as originating from the ‘Tversky
and Khaneman program’, and focusing mainly on human decision making, that entail effects of a
very similar nature, e.g. the disjunction effect and the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Khaneman,
1983; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). In economics, similar effects have been found and identified that
point to a deviation from classical logical thinking when human decisions are at stake, even before
this happened in psychology (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1962). In addition, decision researchers have
discovered the value of quantum modeling, making fruitful use of quantum decision models for
the modeling of a large number of experimentally identified effects (Busemeyer et al., 2006, 2011;
Lambert Mogiliansky et al., 2009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009).
The tendency within the domain of decision-making, certainly in the early years, was to con-
sider these deviations from classicality as ‘fallacies’ – cf. the conjunction fallacy – or, if not
fallacies, as ‘effects’ – cf. the disjunction effect. Concept researchers too imagined that an effect
was at play, i.e. the guppy effect. We ourselves have referred to the phenomenon using such
terms and phrases as ‘effect’ and ‘deviation from classicality’. In this section, we want to show
that the state of affairs is in fact the other way around. What has been called a fallacy, an effect
or a deviation, is a consequence of the dominant dynamics, while what has been considered as a
default to deviate from, namely classical logical reasoning, is a consequence of a secondary form
of dynamics. The dominant dynamics does not give rise to classical logical reasoning. So what is
the nature of this dominant dynamics? Its nature is emergence.
Let us put forward the argumentation that underlies the above hypothesis and that we have
arrived at by analyzing the experiments by Hampton (1988a,b) and our experiments on entangle-
ment (Aerts & Sozzo, 2011). In Table 3 we have presented the exemplars and pairs we want to
consider for our argumentation. A complete collection of all the membership weight data can be
found in Tables 4 and 3 in Aerts (2009a).
An important role is played by the abundance of exemplars with overextension in case of con-
junction, and with underextension in case of disjunction, except for the pair Fruits and Vegetables.
This is the one we modeled in section 5, where disjunction gives rise to overextension too, and in
such a strong way, that we will start from there.
So let us consider Mushroom, whose membership weight for Fruits or Vegetables is 0.9, while
its membership weight for Fruits is 0 and for Vegetables 0.5 (Table 3).
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µ(A) µ(B) µ(A or B) ∆d kd fd
A=Fruits, B=Vegetables
k Mushroom 0 0.5 0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
k Parsley 0 0.2 0.45 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
k Olive 0.5 0.1 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 -0.25
k Root Ginger 0 0.3 0.55 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
k Acorn 0.35 0 0.4 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
k Garlic 0.1 0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.22
k Almond 0.2 0.1 0.43 -0.23 -0.13 -0.15
c Tomato 0.7 0.7 1 -0.3 0.4 -0.09
c Pumpkin 0.7 0.8 0.93 -0.13 0.58 0.02
∆ Mustard 0 0.2 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.03
A=Home Furnishings, B=Furniture
∆ Ashtray 0.3 0.7 0.25 0.45 0.75 -0.25
∆ Painting 0.5 0.9 0.85 0.05 0.55 0.1
c Deck Chair 0.3 0.1 0.35 -0.05 0.05 0.02
A=Hobbies, B=Games
∆ Discus Throwing 1 0.75 0.7 0.3 1.05 -0.18
∆ Camping 1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.1
c Gardening 1 0 1 0 0 0
A=Instruments, B=Tools
∆ Bicycle Pump 1 0.9 0.7 0.3 1.2 -0.25
∆ Goggles 0.2 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.35 -0.1
c Tuning Fork 0.9 0.6 1 -0.1 0.5 -0.04
∆ Spoon 0.65 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.85 -0.08
k Door Key 0.3 0.1 0.95 -0.65 -0.55 -0.58
A=Pets, B=Farmyard Animals
∆ Rat 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.8 -0.2
∆ Cart Horse 0.4 1 0.85 0.15 0.55 0.15
A=Sportswear, B=Sports Equipment
∆ Diving Mask 1 1 0.95 0.05 1,05 -0.05
∆ Underwater 1 0.65 0,6 0.4 1.05 -0.23
µ(A) µ(B) µ(A and B) ∆c kc fc
A=Food, B=Plant
∆ Mint 0.87 0.81 0.9 0.09 0.22 -0.06
∆ Sunflower 0.77 1 0.78 0.01 0.01 0.01
∆ Potato 1 0.74 0.9 0.16 0.16 -0.03
A=Furniture, B=Household Appliances
∆ TV 0.7 0.9 0.93 0.23 0.33 -0.13
∆ Clothes Washer 0.15 1 0.73 0.58 0.58 -0.15
∆ Hifi 0.58 0.79 0.79 0.21 0.42 -0.11
∆ Heated Waterbed 1 0.49 0.78 0.29 0.29 -0.03
∆ Floor Mat 0.56 0.15 0.21 0.06 0.49 0.12
∆ Coffee Table 1 0.15 0.38 0.23 0.23 0.19
A=Building, B=Dwelling
∆ Tree House 0.77 0.846 0.85 0.08 0.23 -0.04
∆ Appartment Block 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.051 0.13 -0.03
c Synagoge 0.93 0.49 0.45 -0.04 0.04 -0.003
c Phone box 0.23 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.74 0.02
A=Machine, B=Vehicle
∆ Course Liner 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.08 0.2 -0.08
Table 3: Membership weight data in Hampton (1988a,b)
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This means that participants estimated Mushroom to be a much stronger member of Fruits or
Vegetables than of Fruits and Vegetables apart. This overextension is so extremely strong, however,
that we will consider it more in detail. None of the participants found Mushroom to be a member
of Fruits, and only half of them found it to be a member of Vegetables, while 90% found it to
be a member of Fruits or Vegetables. This means that at least 40% of the participants found
Mushroom to be ‘not a member of Fruits’, and ‘not a member of Vegetables’, but did find it to be
‘a member of Fruits or Vegetables’. This defies even the wildest interpretation of a classical logical
structure for the disjunction. Additionally, in Aerts (2009a) we proved that the experimental data
for Mushroom cannot be fitted into any type of classical probability structure that could possibly
be devised for the disjunction. Indeed, similarly to (1) and (2), two inequalities can be derived
for the membership weights and for the disjunction, and only if they are satisfied is a classical
probability model possible (Aerts 2009a, theorem 6)
max(µ(A), µ(B))− µ(A or B) = ∆d ≤ 0 (18)
0 ≤ kd = µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A or B) (19)
In Table 3 the values of ∆d, the ‘disjunction maximum rule deviation’, and kd, the ‘Kolmogoro-
vian disjunction factor’, are derived for exemplars and pairs of concepts measured by Hampton
(1988a,b). For Mushroom, we have kd = −0.4 < 0, which proves that a Kolmogorovian probability
model is not possible.
If this type of highly non-classical overextension for disjunction only occurred for Mushroom,
it would be considered an error of the experiment. However, Table 3 shows that it appears in
many other exemplars as well, in only slightly less strong ways. Parsley, Olive, Root Ginger,
Acorn, Garlic, Almond, all follow the same pattern as Mushroom. This means that for all of these
exemplars, the answers of a substantial number of participants have invariably given rise to a kind
of behavior that is highly strange from the point of view of classical logic. While the participants
classified these items as ‘not a member of Fruits’ and ‘not a member of Vegetables’, they did
classify them as ‘a member of Fruits or Vegetables’. It should also be noted that inequality (19)
is violated strongly for each of these exemplars, which means that the data cannot be modeled
within a classical probability structure (see Table 3). We believe that the explanation for this
highly non-classical logic behavior is that the participants considered the exemplars listed above
to be characteristic of the newly emerging concept Fruits or Vegetables, as a concept specially
attractive for exemplars ‘tending to raise doubts as to whether they are fruits or vegetables’. One
very clear example is Tomato, with weight 0.7 for Fruits, weight 0.7 for Vegetables and weight 1
for Fruits or Vegetables, because many indeed will doubt whether Tomato is a fruit or a vegetable.
Of course, any convincing underpinning of our hypothesis of ‘the emergent concept being at the
origin of over and underextension’ would require more data than those of the pair of concepts Fruits
and Vegetables. We therefore verified the hypothesis in great detail for all of Hampton (1988a,b)
data, on disjunction and conjunction, finding that for all pairs there were several exemplars that
convincingly matched our hypothesis. They are listed in Table 3. Ashtray tested for Furniture,
with weight 0.7, and Household Appliances, with weight 0.3, and their disjunction Furniture or
Household Appliances, with weight 0.25, is doubly underextended. We believe this to be due to
Ashtray not at all being considered a member of a concept collecting items that ‘one can doubt
about whether it is a piece of furniture or a household appliance’. A similar explanation can be
given for the double underextension of the exemplars Discus Throwing, Bicycle Pump, Goggles,
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Rat, Diving Mask and Underwater (see Table 3).
Let us now apply our hypothesis about the emergence of a new concept to the case of con-
junction. We will start with Mint, tested by Hampton (1988a) for the conjunction, and yielding
double overextension (see Table 3). We already considered Mint in section 2 and 3, and again our
explanation is that the human mind – following the same dynamics – is persuaded primarily by
the newly emergent concept Food and Plant. It evaluates whether Mint is a strong member of this
new concept, and in doing so it does not evaluate its membership of Food or its membership of
Plant in the way that Food and Plant is considered a classical logical conjunction of Food and of
Plant. There is an abundance of data showing overextension for the conjunction of pairs tested in
Hampton (1988a), and also a significant occurrence of double overextensions, e.g. TV, Tree House
and Course Liner (see Table 3).
While the systematic presence of underextension for disjunction and of overextension for con-
junction strongly support our hypothesis about the dominant dynamics of emergence of a new
concept as compared to the dynamics of classical logical reasoning, it is only part of our argumen-
tation. The other part is made up of what is more like the pieces of a puzzle containing structural
and mathematical elements. In this respect, two words jump to mind, namely ‘average’ and ‘Fock
space’. In the following, we will briefly make a case for this second part of our argumentation.
Firstly, with regard to the word ‘average’, let us consider the basic interference equations (3)
and (14). We see that the average µ(A)+µ(B)
2
figures prominently in both. For (14), the value
of µ(A or B)k is even given by the average plus the quantum interference term <〈A|Mk|B〉,
and this is so for a standard pure quantum interference equation. (3) includes an additional
term m2µ(A)µ(B), which makes this formula not a pure interference formula. This is due to
the other of the above two terms, ‘Fock space’, and we will now explain why. If we accept
our basic hypothesis that the dominant dynamics of reasoning is ‘emergence’ and that classical
logical reasoning is only secondary, it introduces ‘a whole new ball game’. Indeed, overextension,
underextension, the guppy effect, the disjunction effect, and the conjunction fallacy – they have all
been identified assuming that classical logical reasoning is the default. As such, overextension for
conjunction means ‘higher than the minimum’, and underextension for disjunction means ‘lower
than the maximum’. However, if we consider the dominant reasoning to be ‘emergence’, in both
cases – conjunction as well as disjunction – ‘the average’ is the value that acts as a gauge. Both
conjunction and disjunction fluctuate around the average, and this ‘fluctuation around the average’
is interference. So has classical logical reasoning completely disappeared from this whole new ball
game? It has not, and this is where Fock space comes in.
Fock space is traditionally used in quantum field theory. For a quantum field, the number of
entities is commonly not an actuality, i.e. not a fixed quantity. This also means that the state of
a quantum field is usually a superposition of states with different fixed numbers of entities. We
believe that this is exactly the situation we have identified for the combination of concepts. When
two concepts combine, the human mind conceives of this combination partly as an entirely new
concept – we have used the term ‘emergence’ to refer to this part – and partly as an algebraic
combination of two concepts, and the rules of the used algebra are quantum logic. It is in this
‘quantum logic’ part that we find back a probabilistic version of classical logic. The human mind,
however, does not choose one of these ways, but considers both together, or more correctly, a
superposition of both. This superposition state can be described as a vector of Fock space. We
refer to the last section of appendix A for a mathematical definition of Fock space, and to Aerts
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(2009a) for a detailed construction of the Fock space for two combined concepts.
As explained in the last section of appendix A, Fock space consists of two sectors. In the way
we used it to model the combination of concepts, conjunction as well as disjunction, in sector
1, pure interference is modeled, i.e. weights fluctuate around the average, like waves. Sector 2
is a tensor product Hilbert space, and here the combination is modeled such that a probabilistic
version of classical logic, more specifically quantum logic, appears as a modeling of a situation with
two identical exemplars. Let us illustrate this with the following example. Consider Tomato, for
Fruits or Vegetables. In sector 2 of Fock space, two identical exemplars of Tomato, hence Tomato
and Tomato, are considered. One is confronted with Fruits and the other one with Vegetables. If
one of these confrontations leads to acknowledgement of membership, the disjunction is satisfied.
If both confrontations lead to acknowledgement of membership, the conjunction is satisfied. We
can easily recognize the calculus of truth tables from classical logic in the above dynamics, except
that things are probabilistic or fuzzy. Having sketched the dynamics in sector 2 of Fock space, we
can readily see how different it is from the emergence dynamics in sector 1 of Fock space. Indeed,
‘quantum emergent thought’, which consists in reflecting whether Tomato is a member of the
new concept Fruits or Vegetables, is a completely different dynamics of thought than ‘quantum
logical thought’, i.e. the quantum probabilistic version of classical logical thought, which consists
in considering two identical exemplars Tomato and Tomato, reflecting on the question whether
the one is a member of Fruits and whether the other is a member of Vegetables, and then ruling
for disjunction as prescribed by logic.
Also the entanglement of The Animal Acts can be analyzed now. Animal and Acts are modeled
in two Hilbert spaces, and The Animal Acts is modeled in their tensor product, such that a non
product vector of this tensor product can be used to describe the state of entanglement. This
tensor product can be identified with a sector 2 of a Fock space. The entanglement is due to
the human mind choosing exemplars of the newly emergent concept The Animal Acts in such
a way that the probability weights of collapse of the state of The Animal Acts to the states of
these exemplars, are not combinations of weights corresponding to exemplars that are chosen for
the concepts Animal and Acts apart. This is exactly the way entanglement appears for quantum
particles (Aerts & Sozzo, 2011).
Fock space itself is the direct sum of its two sectors. Our modeling of human reasoning is
mathematically situated in the whole of Fock space, and hence in our approach human reasoning
is a superposition of ‘emergent reasoning’ and ‘logical reasoning’ (Aerts 2009a, Aerts & D’Hooghe,
2009). In (3), we introduced the Fock space equation for the conjunction, so that we can now
explain that m2 and n2 are the weights with respect to sectors 2 and 1 of Fock space, i.e. the
weights of ‘logical thought’ (this is m2), and ‘emergent thought’ (this is n2), in human thought as
quantum superposition of both. The general Fock space equation for disjunction is
µ(A or B) = m2(µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A)µ(B)) + n2(µ(A) + µ(B)
2
+ <〈A|M |B〉) (20)
where m2 and n2 play the same role, the weights of ‘quantum logical thought’ and ‘quantum
emergent thought’ in human thought as quantum superposition of both. Interestingly, the Fock
space equation for disjunction can be derived from the Fock space equation for conjunction intro-
duced in section 3 by applying the de Morgan laws to the ‘logical reasoning’ sector of Fock space.
Indeed, (20) can be obtained from (3) if we replace µ(A)µ(B) by 1 − (1 − µ(A))(1 − µ(B))) =
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µ(A) + µ(B) − µ(A)µ(B), which is what we would expect also intuitively from the perspective
introduced in our modeling. This also means that the de Morgan laws are not satisfied when both
‘logical reasoning’ and ‘emergent reasoning’ are taken into account, which makes it possible to
explain the situation of ‘borderline cases’, as we make explicit in the following.
For the disjunction case, we have µ(A) ≤ µ(A)+µ(B)−µ(A)µ(B) and µ(B) ≤ µ(A)+µ(B)−
µ(A)µ(B), from which follows that µ(A)+µ(B)
2
≤ µ(A) + µ(B) − µ(A)µ(B). In the absence of
interference, (20) expresses that µ(A or B) ∈ [µ(A)+µ(B)
2
, µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A)µ(B)]. Hence, values
outside of this interval need a genuine interference contribution for (20) to have a solution. We
introduce
0 ≤ fd = min(µ(A or B)− µ(A) + µ(B)
2
, µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A)µ(B)− µ(A or B)) (21)
as the criterion for a possible solution without the need for genuine interference. The values of fd
are in Table 3.
What happens in sector 1 of Fock space is in many cases dominant to what happens in sector 2,
and this can also be verified experimentally. Comparing the correlations of the Hampton (1988a,b)
data with (i) the average, (ii) the maximum, (iii) the minimum, we find that, for the conjunction,
the correlations for each of the pairs with the average are substantially higher than those with the
minimum, and that, for the disjunction, the correlations for each of the pairs with the average
are substantially higher than those with the maximum. In Aerts et al. (2012) we have given
specifics on these correlations that illustrate the above. This concludes our argumentation for the
presence in human thought as a superposition of a dominant dynamics of emergent thought and
a secondary dynamics of logical thought.
At first sight it may seem that our quantum model for combined concepts does not incorporate
order effects, which are known to exist experimentally. More concretely, experiments on the
combination A and B will often lead to different data than experiments on the combination
B and A, and equally experiments on A or B can have different outcomes than experiments on
B or A. However, order effects can be modeled without problems in our approach, because in the
first sector of Fock space, although A and B and B and A are described by the same superposition
state, the phase of this state is different, leading to different interference angles, and hence different
values for the collapse probabilities. Analogously, A or B, although described by the same state
as B or A, generally leads to different interference angles. This is how the first sector of Fock
space copes in a natural way with order effects. Intuitively we can understand why this is so. As
a new emergent concept, A and B will as a rule indeed be different from B and A, and equally,
as a new emergent concept, A or B will be different from B or A.
An interesting idea was suggested to us by one of the referees. Our modeling can be applied
to the situation of ‘borderline cases’ (see, e.g., Alxatib & Pelletier, 2011; Blutner et al., 2012).
Consider, e.g., the concept A Tall Man. For concepts of this type, the boundary between ‘tall’
and ‘not tall’ is not clearly defined, nor can this lack of clarity be removed by specifying the
exact height of specific exemplars of the concept. As a consequence, it is well possible to find
exemplars both of whose membership weights with respect to the concepts A Tall Man and A
Not Tall Man are different from zero, which phenomenon is known as the borderline contradiction.
The quantum modeling scheme developed in the present paper can overcome this difficulty, since
it admits the possible presence of ‘borderline contradictions’ from the very beginning. Moreover,
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it provides precise predictions with respect to the estimated membership weights. We plan in
the next future to perform an experimental test for conceptual combinations of the ‘borderline’
type, and to compare the predictions of our quantum interference model with a recent finding
that explains ‘borderline contradictions’ as a quantum interference phenomenon (Blutner et al.,
2012).
In the following we comment on some of the questions asked by the referees because they
may be of interest to other readers as well. One question was ‘Why does the Hilbert space we
constructed in section 5 have 25 dimensions, while there are 24 exemplars at play?’ As explained
in appendix A, for our modeling it is the number of orthogonal projections of the spectral family
that coincides with the number of outcomes of an experiment. In the case of the model constructed
in section 5, the number of outcomes of the experiment is indeed 24, each exemplar can be chosen
by the participants, and this is also the number of orthogonal projection operators of the spectral
family used in the model. Since we consider the disjunction of two concepts, which state is
represented by the normalized superposition of two orthogonal vectors |A〉 and |B〉 representing
the states of the concepts A and B, the projection operators of the spectral family project form
a space of dimension two, the subspace generated by |A〉 and |B〉. We could have constructed
a solution with a Hilbert space of dimension 48, taking a two-dimensional space for each of the
range spaces of the orthogonal projection operators. A solution can, however, be found whenever
one two-dimensional subspace is allowed, and this is the one we presented in this article. Another
question was ‘Why have you chosen to describe conjunction as well as disjunction in the way
you do, rather than by following the quantum logical procedure, for instance, where disjunction
would be linked to the join of subspaces, and conjunction to the meet of such subspaces?’ This
interesting question allows us to point out a conceptual aspect of our modeling that is not self-
evident. It is true that in quantum logic the disjunction is connected to the join of subspaces,
and the conjunction, to the meet. However, quantum logic then refers to ‘propositions’ or, more
concretely, ‘properties’ of a quantum entity. The quantum entity itself, also in quantum logic, is
described by a one-dimensional subspace, a ray, of the lattice of closed subspaces of the Hilbert
space. In our approach, we consider the concept itself as an entity, and also a disjunction of
two concepts, as well as a conjunction of two concepts, is again a concept, hence an entity. All
of these need to be described by one-dimensional subspaces, rays, also following quantum logic.
This means that our approach is compatible also with a quantum logical approach. By the way, a
concept too has properties or features, and these properties will be described by closed subspaces
also in our approach. Disjunctions and conjunctions, as new properties, will then be described by
joins and meets of the corresponding subspaces, respectively.
We end this section with a question that we put forward ourselves. ‘Why is it that, if emergent
thought is dominant over logical thought, logical thought has been considered as the default all
this time?’ Classical logic pretends to model ‘valid reasoning’. What the majority of participants
in Hampton (1988b) did in considering Mushroom was emergent thought. Is emergent thought not
valid reasoning? Classical logic is fruitfully applied in mathematics, without leading to situations
comparable to the Mushroom case. Could this hint at an answer to the above questions? We
think so. Classical logic has been discriminative towards certain types of propositions from the
start. The principle of the excluded middle, one of the three basic axioms of classical logic, states
that ‘for any proposition either it is true or its negation is’. This principle cuts away the potential
for emergence, and it is well-known that it is not valid for propositions concerning quantum
entities. Already the Ancient Greeks put forward a very simple proposition that did not satisfy
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this principle, the liar paradox proposition, i.e. the proposition ‘this proposition is false’. In this
sense, it is not a coincidence that we described the liar paradox as a cognitive situation able to
be modeled by quantum theory (Aerts et al., 1999). The proposition ‘this proposition is true’,
although much less vicious, does not satisfy the principle of the excluded middle either. If it is
true, it is true, and if it is false, it is false. Hence, the ‘being true’ and the ‘being false’ depend
directly on the hypothesis made. This is contextuality in its purest form, and we have analyzed
its consequences.
With respect to the principle of the excluded middle, there have been serious doubts about its
validity throughout history. Aristotle pondered about propositions that referred to future events,
such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’ (Aristotle, -350). The famous example of the sea
battle brings us closer to understanding the question about the predominance of logical thought.
We all know that ‘the future is about potentialities and not actualities’. However, we believe that
‘the present is about actualities and not potentialities’. This is too simple a view of the present.
Once context plays an essential role with respect to the values of interest, these values start to
refer to potentialities, and no longer to actualities. To respond to the statement, ‘being a smoker
or not’, we can still consider only actualities, but this no longer holds for statements such as
‘being in favor or against the use of nuclear energy’, because for this type of statement context
plays an essential role (Aerts & Aerts, 1995). This is the reason why quantum structure, which is
mathematically capable of coping with potentialities, comes into play whenever the human mind
needs to assess values. This is the reason why also emergent thought is valid reasoning.
7 Conclusion
We presented our approach to concepts modeling and the way we elaborated a description of
concept combinations by using the mathematical formalism of quantum theory
We explained how several findings in concept research, including the ‘graded nature of exem-
plars’, the ‘guppy effect’ and the ‘overextension’ and ‘underextension’ of membership weights, led
us to recognize the need for quantum modeling and, more specifically, for an approach where ‘con-
cepts can be in different states’ and ‘change states under the influence of context’. We positioned
our approach with respect to the main traditional concept theories, prototype theory, exemplar
theory, and theory theory (section 2).
We illustrated our quantum modeling approach by providing a description of the overextension
for conjunctions of concepts measured by Hampton (1988a) as an effect of quantum interference.
We analyzed in depth what makes quantum interference modeling superior to classical probabilistic
or fuzzy set modeling, and pointed out the essential role of complex numbers (section 3).
In particular, we considered the concept combination The Animal Acts, and explained how we
performed an experiment based on this concept combination to test Bell’s inequalities, and how
this experimented resulted in a violation of the inequalities. In this way we proved the presence
of quantum entanglement in concept combination (section 4).
Furthermore, we considered interference and superposition in the disjunction Fruits or Veg-
etables, at the same time showing that quantum interference patterns naturally appear whenever
suitable exemplars of this disjunction are taken into account. We have calculated the graphics
revealing the interference pattern of Fruits or Vegetables and compared them with the interference
of light in a double slit quantum experiment (section 5).
Finally, we enlightened, again by means of examples, that also emergence occurs in conceptual
processes, and we gathered arguments of an experimental and theoretical nature to put forward
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our main explanatory hypothesis, namely that human thought is the quantum superposition of
‘quantum emergent thought’ and ‘quantum logical thought’, and that our quantum modeling
approach applied in Fock space enables this general human thought to be modeled (section 6).
Appendices
A Quantum Theory for Modeling
When quantum theory is applied for modeling purposes, each entity considered – in our case a
concept – has a corresponding complex Hilbert space H, which is a vector space over the field
C of complex numbers, equipped with an inner product 〈·|·〉, that maps two vectors 〈A| and
|B〉 to a complex number 〈A|B〉. We denote vectors using the bra-ket notation introduced by
Paul Adrien Dirac, one of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics (Dirac, 1958). Vectors
can be kets, denoted |A〉, |B〉, or bras, denoted 〈A|, 〈B|. The inner product between the ket
vectors |A〉 and |B〉, or the bra-vectors 〈A| and 〈B|, is realized by juxtaposing the bra vector
〈A| and the ket vector |B〉, and 〈A|B〉 is also called a bra-ket, and it satisfies the following
properties: (i) 〈A|A〉 ≥ 0; (ii) 〈A|B〉 = 〈B|A〉∗, where 〈B|A〉∗ is the complex conjugate of 〈A|B〉;
〈A|(z|B〉 + t|C〉) = z〈A|B〉 + t〈A|C〉, for z, t ∈ C, where the sum vector z|B〉 + t|C〉 is called a
‘superposition’ of vectors B〉 and C〉 in the quantum jargon. From (ii) and (iii) follows that it
is linear in the ket and anti-linear in the bra, i.e. (z〈A| + t〈B|)|C〉 = z∗〈A|C〉 + t∗〈B|C〉. We
recall that the absolute value of a complex number is defined as the square root of the product
of this complex number times its complex conjugate. Hence we have |〈A|B〉| = √〈A|B〉〈B|A〉.
We define the ‘length’ of a ket (bra) vector |A〉 (〈A|) as |||A〉|| = ||〈A||| = √〈A|A〉. A vector of
unitary length is called a ‘unit vector’. We say that the ket vectors |A〉 and |B〉 are ‘orthogonal’
and write |A〉 ⊥ |B〉 if 〈A|B〉 = 0. We have introduced the necessary mathematics to describe the
first modeling rule of quantum theory, which is the following.
First quantum modeling rule: A state of an entity – in our case a concept – modeled by quantum
theory is represented by a ket vector |A〉 with length 1, i.e. 〈A|A〉 = 1.
An orthogonal projection M is a linear function on the Hilbert space, hence M : H → H, |A〉 7→
M |A〉, which is Hermitian and idempotent, which means that for |A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and z, t ∈ C we
have (i) M(z|A〉+t|B〉) = zM |A〉+tM |B〉 (linearity); (ii) 〈A|M |B〉 = 〈B|M |A〉 (hermiticity); and
(iii) M ·M = M (idempotency). The identity, mapping each vector on itself, is a trivial orthogonal
projection, denoted 1. We say that two orthogonal projections Mk and Ml are orthogonal, if each
vector contained in Mk(H) is orthogonal to each vector contained in Ml(H), and we write in this
case Mk ⊥ Ml. A set of orthogonal projection operators {Mk |k = 1, . . . , n} is called a spectral
family, if all projectors are mutually orthogonal, i.e. Mk ⊥ Ml for k 6= l, and their sum is the
identity, i.e.
∑n
k=1Mk = 1. This gives us the necessary mathematics to describe the second
modeling rule.
Second quantum modeling rule: A measurable quantity of an entity – in our case a concept –
modeled by quantum theory, and having a set of possible real values {a1, . . . , an} is represented
by a spectral family {Mk |k = 1, . . . , n} in the following way. If the entity is in a state represented
by the vector |A〉, this state is changed to a state represented by one of the vectorsMk|A〉/‖Mk|A〉‖,
with probability 〈A|Mk|A〉. In this case the value of the quantity is ak,and the change of state
taking place is called collapse in the quantum jargon.
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The tensor product HA⊗HB of two Hilbert spaces HA and HB is the Hilbert space generated by
the set {|A〉i ⊗ |B〉j}, where |A〉i and |B〉j are vectors of HA and HB, respectively, which means
that a general vector of this tensor product is of the form
∑
ij |A〉i ⊗ |B〉j. This gives us the
necessary mathematics to introduce the third modeling rule.
Third quantum modeling rule: A state p of a compound entity – a combined concept – is represented
by a unit vector |C〉 of the tensor productHA⊗HB of the two Hilbert spacesHA andHB containing
the vectors that represent the states of the component entities – concepts.
The above means that we have |C〉 =∑ij |A〉i⊗ |B〉j, where |A〉i and |B〉j are unit vectors of HA
and HB, respectively. We say that the state p represented by |C〉 is a product state if it is of the
form |A〉 ⊗ |B〉 for some |A〉 ∈ HA and |B〉 ∈ HB. Otherwise, p is called an ‘entangled state’.
Fock space is a specific type of Hilbert space, originally introduced in quantum field theory. For
most states of a quantum field the number of identical quantum entities is not an actuality,
i.e. predictable quantity. Fock space copes with this situation in allowing its vectors to be
superpositions of vectors pertaining to sectors for fixed numbers of identical quantum entities.
Such a sector, describing a fixed number of j identical quantum entities, is of the form H⊗ . . .⊗H
of the tensor product of j identical Hilbert spaces H. Fock space F itself is the direct sum of all
these sectors, hence
F = ⊕jk=1 ⊗kl=1 H (22)
For our modeling we have only used Fock space for the ‘two’ and ‘one quantum entity’ case, hence
F = H⊕ (H⊗H). This is due to considering only combinations of two concepts. A unit vector
|F 〉 ∈ F is then written as |F 〉 = neiγ|C〉 + meiδ(|A〉 ⊗ |B〉), where |A〉, |B〉 and |C〉 are unit
vectors of H, and such that n2 + m2 = 1. For combinations of j concepts, the general form of
Fock space expressed in equation (22) will have to be used.
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